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We study the implications of the carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology availability on
the optimal use of polluting exhaustible resources and on optimal climate policies. We develop
an endogenous growth model in which the accumulated stock of greenhouse gas emissions harms
social welfare. Since CCS technology allows reducing the eﬀective pollution for each unit of
resource use, extraction and pollution are partially disconnected. CCS accelerates the optimal
extraction pace, though it may foster CO2 emissions for the early generations. Moreover, it is
detrimental to output growth. Next, we study the implementation of a unit tax on pollution.
Contrary to previous results of the literature, its level here matters, as it provides the right
incentives to CCS eﬀort. The optimal growth rate of this carbon tax is positive, though we
indicate that this climate policy instrument can be interpreted ex-post as a decreasing ad-
valorem tax on the resource.
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JEL classiﬁcation: O32, O41, Q20, Q321 Introduction
The exploitation of fossil resources raises two concerns: the ﬁrst one is scarcity, because fossil re-
sources are exhaustible by nature, the second one is related to greenhouse gases (GHG) emission
associated to their combustion.
Numerous models deal with this double issue. Some of them are placed in the context of
partial equilibrium (e.g. Sinclair [17, 18]), Withagen [23], Ulph and Ulph [22], Tahvonen [21])
whereas some others tackle this issue in a general equilibrium growth frameworks (Schou [16,
17], Grimaud and Rouge [5, 6], Groth and Schou [7]). Two main questions are addressed:
the socially optimal outcome on the one hand, and, on the other hand, its implementation
in a decentralized economy along with the impacts of environmental policies. It is generally
shown that postponing the resource extraction, and thus the polluting emissions, is optimal.
In addition, model recommendations in terms of environmental policy are less unanimous. For
instance, Sinclair [18] advocates a decreasing ad valorem tax on resource use, whereas Ulph and
Ulph [22], among others, show that such a tax may not always be optimal, especially when the
pollution stock partially decays. Considering the sole endogenous growth models with polluting
exhaustible resources, with the exception of Schou [16, 17] for whom no environmental policy
is required, results generally exhibit a decreasing optimal carbon tax (see Grimaud and Rouge
[5, 6] or Groth and Schou [7]). Moreover, as in Sinclair [18], a change of the tax level only has
redistributive eﬀects and does not alter the model dynamics, e.g. neither the extraction nor the
pollution emission time-paths.
A common feature of those papers lies in the systematic link between resource extraction and
pollution emission, in the form of a simple functional relation, generally linear. It is therefore
equivalent to tax either the pollution stream or the resource use itself. Nevertheless, the emer-
gence of a technological option such as carbon sequestration, more precisely CO2 capture and
1storage (hereafter CCS), in order to tackle climate change, partially breaks this link1. Indeed,
the possibility to sequester a fraction of the CO2 emission inherent to fossil resource combustion
disconnects the resource use from the eﬀective pollution. This article aims at considering the
availability of such a technology in the context of an endogenous growth model with a polluting
exhaustible resource and at assessing how the main literature results recalled above, namely in
terms of optimal policy, are modiﬁed in such a framework2.
We develop an endogenous growth model in which the production of consumption goods
requires the input of an extracted resource, whose stock is available in limited quantities. Fur-
thermore, this resource use generates polluting emission, interpreted as GHG emission, whose
ﬂow in turn damages the environment, whose quality index is here considered as a stock. No-
tice that the environment features partial natural regeneration capacity. Finally, the index of
environmental quality enters the utility function as an argument and thus allows gauging how
the pollution accumulation aﬀects the welfare. But the main novelty of the model lies in the
consideration of the CCS availability, which, via some eﬀort, allows for the partial storage of
CO2 release. Then, we distinguish between the total potential CO2 emission associated to one
unit of fossil resource (referred to as total carbon content per unit of resource in the remainder)
and the eﬀective emission, i.e. the remaining pollution fraction left after CO2 removal. The
implication in terms of climate change policy is then straightforward: the ﬁrst best outcome can
only be restored by taxing the pollution but not by taxing the resource itself3.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. The availability of CCS speeds up the
1The possibility of capturing and sequestering some fraction of the carbon dioxide arising from fossil fuel
combustion has recently caught a lot of attention, reinforced by its recent demonstrated viability (for an overview
see IPCC special report [11]).
2Numerous studies have addressed the eﬀect of pollution abatement in models with environmental concerns
and growth (e.g. Smulders and Gradus [20]). With respect to this literature, one can consider CCS technology to
be an important abatement possibility. This question has been addressed in several empirical studies on climate
change (e.g. Gerlagh and van der Zwaan [3]) but to our knowledge, it has never been examined in theoretical
models with endogenous growth.
3Here we assume that the regulator is able to fully measure the greenhouse gases emissions. This may not be
systematically the case: While emission data is fairly reliable in industrialized countries, collecting accurate data
on industrial activities from developing regions and deducting the emissions may prove more diﬃcult.
2optimal pace of resource extraction while relaxing the environmental constraint. Additionally, it
modiﬁes the emissions time-path of GHG. In the long term, the pollution level decreases without
ambiguity. But, if the preference for environmental quality is not manifest enough, the pollution
level may increase in the short term; in this case, the following counter-intuitive result emerges:
the introduction of a carbon sequestration technology leads to an increase of CO2 emissions from
the early generations. Lastly, the availability of such a technology reveals detrimental for the
output growth because of acceleration in resource extraction combined with a negative eﬀect on
R&D eﬀort.
In our framework, as mentioned earlier, a tax on pollution is not equivalent to a tax on
resource use anymore; emissions are the ones to be taxed in order to obtain ﬁrst best results.
Besides, contrary to results obtained in a context without CCS, as in Sinclair [18] or Grimaud
and Rouge [5, 6] for instance, the tax level here matters and especially allows for setting the
optimal CCS eﬀort level. We also show that an increase in this tax leads the economy to
postpone the extraction (which falls back in the standard literature discussed above), and also
modiﬁes the pollution quantity emitted per unit of resource used.
We ﬁnally derive the optimal tax trajectory which exhibits a positive optimal growth rate
(that stems from the decreasing marginal utility of consumption). We also show that this tax
can be expressed ex-post as a decreasing ad-valorem tax on the resource.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We give some additional elements on
carbon capture and sequestration in section 2. We present the model as well as the social
optimum in section 3 and we portray the decentralized equilibrium in section 4. In section 5,
we compare both market and optimal outcomes. We then analyze the eﬀects of climate change
policy and the incentives to carry out R&D. Lastly, we characterize the optimal policies. In
section 6, we conduct a numerical illustration to examine the eﬀect of technical change in CCS
technology. Conclusive remarks are given in section 7.
32 Background - The carbon capture and sequestration techno-
logy
As formulated by Hoﬀert et al. [9], the decarbonization, i.e. the reduction of the carbon
content of each fossil fuel unit, i.e. the amount of carbon emitted per unit of primary energy, is
intimately linked to sequestration. Carbon capture, sometimes referred to as emissions control
(see Kolstad and Toman [13]), is the way of achieving this decarbonization. This process consists
in separating the carbon dioxide from other ﬂux gases during the process of energy production.
It is particularly adapted to large-scale centralized power stations but may also indirectly apply
to non electric energy supply4. Once captured, the gases are then being disposed into various
reservoirs. The sequestration reservoirs include depleted oil and gas ﬁelds, depleted coal mines,
deep saline aquifers, oceans, trees and soils. Those various deposits diﬀer in their respective
capacities, their costs of access or their eﬀectiveness in storing the carbon permanently.
Despite the numerous uncertainties still surrounding the sizable deployment of carbon cap-
ture technologies, especially with regard to the ecological consequences of massive carbon injec-
tion, this technological option has become promising for the fossil energy extractive industry.
The estimated cost of carbon capture ranges from 40 to 90USD per ton of CO2 captured and
stored (IEA [10]). This would translate into an increase of the electricity cost by 25 to 45%, de-
pending on the technologies. According to IEA forecasts, the use of carbon capture and storage
technologies will account for 20 to 28% of the CO2 emission reductions in 2050, i.e. from 6500
to 7500 million tons of CO2 could be avoided, 60% in the sole power sector.Coal use will then
be 13% to 32% higher than today’s level.
In what follows, since the focus of this paper is the impact of the carbon storage option on
optimal and equilibrium paths, as well as the design of climate and R&D policies, we take the
4The hydrogen obtained without carbon emission from fossil fuels and CO2 removal devices, could then supply
the transportation energy needs owing to fuel cells.
4following assumptions. Without loss of generality we do not distinguish the capture phase from
the injection one. We may also neglect the carbon sinks per se, and we implicitly assume that
their capacity is of inﬁnite size5. More importantly, we assume for the sake of simplicity that
carbon capture can be applied to any consumed fossil fuel unit whatever its use, i.e. we do not
distinguish among the various fossil fuel uses as long as the extraction is dedicated to energy
production matters.
3 Model and Optimal Paths
3.1 Disaggregated Model
There is a continuum of consumption goods, indexed on the unit interval. Each good j, j ∈ [0;1],
is produced by Nj ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm nj (nj = 1,...,Nj) simultaneously produces good j, performs




njt , 0 < α < 1 and ν > 0. (1)
At is the stock of existing knowledge at time t, LY njt is the amount of labour devoted to
consumption goods, and Rnjt is the ﬂow of non-renewable resource.
Technology for production of knowledge is
˙ Anjt = δLAnjtAt, δ > 0, (2)
where LAnjt is the amount of labour devoted to research and Anjt is the stock of knowledge





5The level of aggregation of our model makes this assumption reasonable: one can consider that deep saline
aquifers and ocean carbon sinks are suﬃciently large with regard to the ultimate amount of CO2 needed to be
sequestered.
5Pollution is generated by the use of the non-renewable natural resource within the production
process. In case of no carbon storage, pollution ﬂow would be a linear function of resource use:
γRnjt, where γ > 0. In this way, γRnjt can be seen as the carbon content of resource extraction
by ﬁrm nj or, equivalently, as maximum potential pollution by ﬁrm nj. Nevertheless, ﬁrm nj
can store part of this carbon so that the actual emitted ﬂow of pollution is
Pnjt = γRnjt − Qnjt, (3)
where Qnjt is stored carbon. We assume that Qnjt is produced from two inputs, the pollution
content γRnjt via the amount of extracted resource Rnjt and dedicated labour LQnit according
to the following Cobb-Douglas CCS technology:
Qnjt = (γRnjt)ηL
1−η
Qnit, 0 < η < 1, if LQnit < γRnjt (4)
and
Qnjt = γRnjt, if LQnit ≥ γRnjt.
For any given γRnjt, the total cost of labour, LQnit = Q
1/(1−η)
njt (γRnjt)−η/(1−η), is an in-
creasing and convex function of Qnjt. The marginal and average labour costs, respectively
∂LQnit/∂Qnjt = [1/(1 − η)]Q
η/(1−η)
njt (γRnjt)−η/(1−η) and LQnit/Qnjt = Q
η/(1−η)
njt (γRnjt)−η/(1−η),
are also increasing functions of Qnjt. The Cobb-Douglas form allows simple analytical develop-
ments. Let us brieﬂy discuss this CCS technology. Given any quantity of potentially emitted
carbon γRnjt, it is the eﬀort in terms of labour only that enables carbon capture. Of course,
one could also consider physical capital for instance. However, this would yield further compu-
tational complexity as it would add another state variable. Our CCS technology is such that
the fraction of stored carbon, Qnjt/γRnjt, is comprised between 0 and 1. The pollution ﬂow is
6fully stored as soon as LQnit ≥ γRnjt.













the total amount of labour in production, R&D and carbon storage. Similarly, total extracted








nj Qnjt)dj and total ﬂow of




nj Pnjt)dj = γRt − Qt.
The non-renewable resource is extracted from an initial ﬁnite stock S0. There are no extrac-
tion costs. At each date t, a ﬂow − ˙ St of non renewable resource is extracted,
˙ St = −Rt. (5)
The ﬂow of pollution (Pt) aﬀects negatively the stock of environment (Et). We assume
Et = E0 −
￿ t
0 Pseθ(s−t)ds, with E0 > 0, and θ is the (supposed constant) positive rate of
regeneration. This gives the following law of motion
·
Et = θ(E0 − Et) − Pt. (6)
Population is assumed constant, normalized to one, and each individual is endowed with one
unit of labour. Thus we have:
1 = LY t + LAt + LQt. (7)
The household’s instantaneous utility function depends on both consumption cjt, j ∈ [0;1],
and the stock of environment Et











e−ρtdt, 0 < ε < 1, ρ > 0 and ω ≥ 0, (8)
6It would be equivalent to assume that utility is a decreasing function of the pollution stock Xt = X0 +
￿ t
0 Pse
θ(s−t)ds. From this expression, one gets the law of motion
·
Xt = θ(X0 −Xt)+Pt and we have the following
correspondence: Xt − X0 = E0 − Et.
7where cjt = Yjt =
￿Nj
nj Ynjt, that is, the whole production of good j is consumed by the
representative household. Note that, contrary to Aghion and Howitt [1] for instance, the instant-
aneous marginal utility of the stock of environment, ω, is constant. In the case of strong damages
to the environment, it may be more realistic to consider that this marginal utility is increasing
(think of catastrophic events). Nevertheless, this assumption allows for simple computations in
a general equilibrium model.
3.2 Welfare
3.2.1 Characterization of optimal paths
Now we characterize the optimum in the symmetric case, in which Nj = N, Ynj = Y/N,
Rnj = R/N, LY nj = LY /N, LAnj = LA/N, LQnj = LQ/N and Qnj = Q/N. The results
are given in Appendix 1, where we fully characterize the optimal transition time-paths of the
economy. The main results are summarized in the following Proposition 1. We drop time
subscripts for notational convenience (upper-script o stands for optimum and gX is the rate of
growth of any variable X).
Proposition 1 (i) In the case of strictly positive environmental preference (ω > 0), due to the
presence of the environmental stock E, the economy is always in transition and asymptotically
converges towards the case where pollution does not matter (ω = 0).
(ii) The extraction ﬂow, Ro, decreases over time (i.e. go
R < 0); moreover, strictly positive
environmental preference slows down the process. As the optimal ﬂows of sequestration (Qo)
and of pollution (Po) are proportional to Ro, they also decrease over time.
(iii) Labor in production, Lo
Y , is constant over time. Labor in sequestration, Lo
Q, is pro-
protional to the ﬂow of extraction, Ro, and thus follows the same dynamics (i.e. go
LY = go
R).
Therefore, labor in research, Lo
A, increases over time and converges to 1 − Lo
Y as time goes to
inﬁnity.
8All optimal levels and growth rates are given in Appendix 1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
3.2.2 General comments
Let us give some comments on formulas (30)-(38) and let us ﬁrst consider the case where ω =
0, i.e., the environmental quality does not aﬀect the households’s utility. Here, the econony
immediately jumps to its steady-state. From (30), (31), (32) and (34), we can see that Lo
Qt = 0,
Qo
t = 0 and Lo
At = 1 − αρ/δν: no sequestration is undertaken, and the eﬀorts dedicated to
production and R&D are constant. Moreover, B becomes nil and go
Rt = −ρ from (37). Since
we are in a no-CCS case, Po
t = γRo
t (from (35)): this means that the total carbon content of
each unit of extracted resource is emitted. Hence, the growth rate of pollution is constant, as
the growth rate of extraction.
Finally, one also easily obtains from (38) that the growth rate of output, go
Y t, is equal to
νδ−ρ, as in more general endogenous growth models with non-polluting non-renewable resources
(see for example Grimaud and Rouge [4]). In addition, it will be shown later that the optimal
outcome of this economy when ω = 0 is identical to the decentralized outcome of an economy
where no climate policy is implemented but where research is optimally funded.
We now turn to the case where ω > 0. Contrary to the preceding case, the economy is now
always in transition. From (33), Ro
t also decreases over time but go
Rt is now greater than −ρ. In
other words, when the environmental quality aﬀects the households’s utility, the social planner




t are linear function of Ro
t, they exhibit similar dynamics: they
decrease over time and so do their growth rates. Evidently, this also implies that the fraction
of captured emissions, i.e. Qo
t/Po
t , remains constant over time.
Note that Lo
Y is also constant over time (see (30)). Hence, the remaining ﬂow of labour is
9split between carbon storage and research. As Lo
Qt decreases over time, Lo
At increases: as the
eﬀort in carbon storage gets lower and lower, R&D investment is rising.




Pt tends to −ρ. At the same time, Lo
Qt decreases
down to 0, Lo
At tends to 1−αρ/δν and go
Y t tends to νδ−ρ. Those asymptotic values are identical
to the ones from the steady state obtained above where ω = 0. The resource is asymptotically
exhausted and thus the pollution ﬂow tends to zero. That is the reason why, at inﬁnity, the
socially optimal time-path converges to the one of an economy where pollution does not matter
anymore.
For the sake of illustration, we conduct numerical simulations of the model owing to the
following parameters values: E0 = 0,S0 = 250,A0 = 1,α = 0.667,ρ = 0.025,γ = 0.5,η =
0.8,ω = 0.01,δ = 0.02,θ = 0.05,ν = 1.5. The trajectories of resource extraction, pollution,
environmental quality and ﬁnal good production are depicted in ﬁgures 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
3.2.3 Impact of carbon storage on optimal paths
We denote by Xo∅
t the optimal level of any variable Xt when no technology of carbon storage
is available (which is the case in most standard growth models). We give the optimal levels and
growth rates in Appendix 2.
Comparing the social optimum in this case with the optimum presented above leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Introducing carbon storage alters the optimum results as follows:
(i) Resource extraction is faster (i.e. go
Rt < go∅
Rt): more resource is extracted in the early
stages, and less in the future.
(ii) The short and long run eﬀects on pollution may diﬀer. In the short run, the increase in
resource extraction (see (i) above) favors pollution augmentation whereas carbon storage activity
leads to the opposite outcome: the overall eﬀect is ambiguous. In the long run, since resource
10extraction diminishes (see (i) above) and part of the emissions is stored, the pollution ﬂow
decreases without ambiguity.
(iii) Economic growth is lower (i.e. go
Y t < go∅
Y t).
The speed up of resource extraction (go
Rt < go∅
Rt) is depicted in Figure 1. Standard models
with non-renewable resources show that the optimal extraction is less fast when pollution is taken
into account. Here, we can see that CCS allows to partially relax this environmental constraint.
As formulated in the above proposition, the impact of carbon storage on the optimal pollution
paths is less obvious. Let us ﬁrst consider the early generations. Two opposite eﬀects drive
the pollution path: an extraction eﬀect and a CCS eﬀect. Since resource extraction increases,
pollution tends to increase as well; however CCS activity diminishes pollution emissions. The
question is then: which eﬀect dominates? In fact, this depends on the parameters of the model
featured in the terms between brackets in formula (35). In particular, one can check that for high
values of ω the CCS eﬀect tends to be the strongest. This means that when households value
environment a lot, carbon storage is intensive, and thus pollution diminishes despite the increase
in resource use. In this case, carbon storage diminishes optimal pollution for the ﬁrst generations
(as illustrated in Figure 2). If ω is low, i.e., households are less sensitive to environmental quality,
the extraction eﬀect dominates the CCS one: pollution increases since carbon storage activity
is low. We thus have the counter-intuitive case in which carbon storage leads to a simultaneous
increase in resource extraction and pollution for the ﬁrst generations. In the long-term, carbon
storage unambiguously induces lower pollution for the future generations. Indeed, we have shown
that extraction decreases; thus, whatever the amount of carbon stored, pollution decreases.
Let us now turn to the eﬀect of CCS on optimal growth. First, Lo∅
Qt and Qo∅
t are obviously
nil. This implies Lo
At < Lo∅
At: the amount of labour devoted to R&D is higher in the "no-storage
case" as there is no need to use labour for storage. So there is a ﬁrst research eﬀect which
is detrimental for growth. In addition, the aforementioned extraction eﬀect also holds growth
11back. In other words, the ﬁrst two inequalities presented in Proposition 2 immediately yield
the following one: go
Y t = νδLo
At + (1 − α)go
Rt < go∅
Y t = νδLo∅
At + (1 − α)go∅
Rt, that is, carbon
storage is detrimental for economic growth. The technology of carbon storage allows to relax
the environmental constraint. Hence, in an economy with carbon storage technology, early
generations extract more resource and consume more at the optimum. In other words, their
"sacriﬁce" is reduced (see Figure 4).
4 Decentralized Economy
Let us now give some words about the decentralized economy, and, in particular, the way we
model innovation activities.
In contrast with the standard endogenous growth literature, in our model, new pieces of
knowledge are not embodied in intermediate goods. They are directly used by ﬁrms and pro-
tected by inﬁnitely-lived patents (that is, directly priced). As knowledge is a public good, there
are two main diﬃculties for funding it. First, it is diﬃcult to extract the whole willingness
to pay of agents that use knowledge (see for instance Popp [15]); for Jones and Williams [12],
investments in R&D in the US are at least two to four times lower than their optimal level. We
therefore introduce one exogenous parameter ψ which represents the gap between the willingness
to pay and the price perceived by sellers of innovations in the research sector (this parameter
will be interpreted as a subsidy to R&D later in the text). A second diﬃculty arises from the
non-convexity of technologies of ﬁrms using knowledge as a productive factor. In a perfectly
competitive environment, proﬁts for these ﬁrms would be negative and a general competitive
equilibrium would not exist. We therefore assume an imperfect competition (à la Cournot) in
markets for consumption goods. By selling these goods at a price which is higher than the
marginal cost, ﬁrms get resources that allow them to buy knowledge.
Thus, this model features three basic distortions with respect to the optimum. First, the ﬂow
12of pollution, Pt, which damages the stock of environment; second, the distortion on innovations
markets mentionned above; ﬁnally, the Cournot competition in the markets for consumption
goods. This latter distortion will be shown not to prevent equilibrium variables from being
optimal. Hence we introduce two economic tools: a tax on pollution, and a subsidy to research.
Note that our climate policy consists in a tax on pollution, and not on the polluting resource,
as in Grimaud and Rouge [5, 6] or Groth and Schou [7]. Indeed, the basic externality is carbon
emissions and, as technology for carbon storage is available, a tax on these emissions and a
tax on the polluting resource are no more equivalent (contrary to what happens in the papers
mentioned above).
As will be shown below, this tax on carbon emissions has two main eﬀects: it leads to
postponing extraction (as in the models without carbon storage possibility). It also yields
incentives to produce optimal eﬀorts in carbon storage at each time t.
4.1 Agents’ behaviour
Wage is normalized to one: wt = 1, and pjt (j ∈ [0;1]), pRt, rt and Vt are, respectively, the price
of consumption good j, the price of the non-renewable resource, the interest rate on a perfect
ﬁnancial market and the unit price of knowledge (in terms of labour). We drop time subscripts
for notational convenience.
Household
The representative household maximizes (8) subject to her budget constraint ˙ b = rb + w +
π −
￿ 1
0 pjcjdj + T, where b is her total wealth, π represents total proﬁts in the economy and T
is a lump-sum subsidy (or tax). Recall that we normalized w to 1. One gets the two following










k dk), and Ramsey-Keynes condition is















As usual, the transversality condition is limt→+∞ St = 0.
Firms
Recall that ﬁrms have three activities. First, each one produces and sells a diﬀerentiated good
on an imperfect market. Second, it produces and sells innovations which we assume traded using
bilateral contracts between inventors and users. Thirdly, ﬁrm stores part of emitted carbon.
Vt is the price of one innovation at date t in the research sector. Let us denote by ˜ πnjt
the proﬁt of ﬁrm nj without payment of knowledge. At each moment, ﬁrm nj maximizes








+Vt ˙ Anjt−LAnjt, subject
to (1), (2), and (9), where τt is a unit tax on pollution (note that it also corresponds to the
price of permits on a competitive market in the case of tradeable permits). After substitutions,
14one gets the following program:
max ˜ πnj = Ynj[Ω1−ε(
Nj ￿
nk=1







+V δALAnj − LAnj
subject to Ynj = AνLα
Y njR1−α
nj ,
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to Ynj, Rnj, LY nj, LQnj, and LAnj are respectively




Ynk)ε−1 + (ε − 1)YnjΩ1−ε(
Nj ￿
nk=1
Ynk)ε−2−λ = 0. (12)
This equation implicitely yields the best response of ﬁrm nj to the choice of production of the
















−1 + τγη(1 − η)Rη
njL
−η
Qnj = 0, (15)
V δA − 1 = 0. (16)
The willingnesses to pay for pieces of knowledges A at each date t is
vnj = ∂˜ πnj/∂A = V δLAnj + λνYnj/A. (17)
15Each piece of knowledge being simultaneously used by research and production activities,
V δLAnj is the willingness to pay relative to research activity and λνYnj/A is the willingness to
pay relative to production -the public good nature of knowledge inside the ﬁrm is here manifest.
4.2 Equilibrium
Here, an equilibrium is a set of proﬁles of quantities and prices such that: the representative
household maximizes utiliy and ﬁrms maximize proﬁts; labour, resource and ﬁnancial markets
are perfectly competitive; on each consumption good market, there is Cournot competition;
pieces of knowledge are traded using bilateral contracts. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium.
Let us ﬁrst express both the social value and the market value of one unit of knowledge.
In (17), λ can be replaced by LY nj/αYnj (see formula (14)). Summing on nj and j, one gets
v = V δLA + νLY /αA : this corresponds to the instantaneous social value of one piece of
knowledge.
From now on, we assume that ﬁrms are unable to extract the whole willingnesses to pay for
knowledge due to information and excludability problems. In fact, they only extract a fraction ¯ v.
The extracted value for one unit of knowledge is: ¯ v = V δLA+ψνLY /αA, where ψ ∈ [0;1]. This
is the instantaneous market value of one piece of knowledge. This formulation allows for simple
computations and can be interpreted as follows: innovators are able to fully observe the social
value of innovations in the research activity, but not in the production activity. Furthermore,
in the following, we will interpret an increase in ψ as an economic policy aiming at fostering




t rududs. Diﬀerentiating with








which states that the rate of return is the same in both the ﬁnancial market and the research
16sector.
We now turn to the derivation of the consumption goods price. Since we are in the symmetric
case (in particular we have Ynj = Yj/N = Y/N and pj = p), equations (12) and (14) lead to
p[1 + (ε − 1)/N] = LY /αY (19)
where LY /αY is the marginal cost. Since ε < 1, this equation means that the price of any
consumption good is higher than its marginal cost. The discrepancy between price and marginal
cost allows ﬁrms to buy knowledge despite the non-convexity of technology. Observe that, if
N = 1 (monopolistic case), (19) becomes p = (marginal cost)/ε, which is the standard result.
The main ﬁndings concerning the equilibrium are summarized in the following Proposition.
We drop time subscripts for notational convenience (upper-script e stands for equilibrium).
Proposition 3 At the equilibrium in the decentralized economy with a strictly positive carbon
tax (i.e. τ > 0) at each date:
(i) The economy is always in transition.
(ii) The ﬂow of resource extraction, Re, as well as the ﬂows of sequestration, Qe, and of
pollution, Pe, decrease over time.
(iii) Labour in ﬁnal good production, Le
Y , is constant over time. Labour devoted to storage
activities, Le
Q, is proportional to the ﬂow of resource extraction, Re, and thus follows the same
dynamics: ge
LQt = ge
Rt < 0. Therefore, labour devoted to research, Le
A, increases over time and
converges to the constant level 1 − Le
Y as time goes to inﬁnity.
All equilibrum levels and growth rates are given in Appendix 3.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Let us now consider that there is no climate policy (i.e. τ = 0 at each date). Here, the
economy immediatly jumps to its steady-state, where the amount of labour devoted to carbon
17storage is nil (see formula (51)): Le
Q = 0, which means that no carbon is stored (Qe = 0). This,
in turn, implies that the total potential emission is released in the atmosphere, i.e. Pe = γRe.
Moreover, labor used in the production of the ﬁnal good, Le
Y , is constant, and thus labor
devoted to the research sector, Le
A = 1 − Le
Y is also constant. The ﬂow of extraction at date
t is Re
t = ρS0e−ρt, and pR0 = (1 − α)/ψνδS0. This implies ge
R = −ρ for all t when no tax
on pollution is levied. This latter case corresponds to the optimum without pollution (and no
carbon storage).
We now compare the equilibrium growth rate of resource extraction (ge
R) in the absence of cli-
mate policy to its optimal level. Combining the previous results with those given in Proposition
1, we obtain the following inequalities:
ge




Rt is the optimal growth rate of extraction in the case of no available technology for
carbon storage (deﬁned in section 3.2.3). First, ge
R < go∅
Rt means that, in an economy in which
no technology for carbon storage is available, resource extraction in the laissez-faire economy is
too fast, compared to the optimal path. For a similar result in a partial equilibrium context,
see Withagen [23]. Nevertheless, introducing carbon storage into the analysis leads to two
complementary results. The inequality ge
R = −ρ < go
Rt is an extension of the previous result:
even if carbon storage is possible, it is optimal to postpone extraction, relative to what is done
in the decentralized laissez-faire equilibrium. However, the inequality go
Rt < go∅
Rt states that in
the case of carbon storage, the optimal extraction paths is less restrictive than in the absence of
such technology. In other words, carbon storage partially relaxes the environmental constraint.
As we stated earlier, the sacriﬁce of earlier generations is reduced.
Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, obtained through numerical simulations (see section 3.2.2), illustrate the
preceding results.
185 Impact of Economic Policies
5.1 Impact of climate and R&D policies
Let us ﬁrst study the impacts of climate policy (a carbon tax on carbon emissions Pe) on the
equilibrium paths of this economy.
Proposition 4 An increase in the carbon tax τ has the following eﬀects:
(i) Resource extraction and carbon emissions decrease at a lower pace, and so does the eﬀort





(ii) The intensity of eﬀort in CCS (Le
Qt/Qe
t), the eﬀort by unit of carbon content (Le
Qt/γRe
t),
as well as the instantaneous rate of carbon storage (Qe
t/γRe
t), all increase.
(iii) Eﬀective pollution by unit of carbon content (Pe
t /γRe
t) decreases.
(iv) The eﬀort in production (Le
Y ) remains unchanged.
Assume 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1/(1 − η). An increase in tax τ has two basic eﬀects: ﬁrst, pollution gets
more costly, which leads the economy to postpone extraction (ge
Rt increases). A second eﬀect
is that carbon storage becomes more proﬁtable; hence the amount of labour by unit of carbon
content (Le
Qt/γRe
t) increases. Therefore, Qe
t/γRe
t, that is, the instantaneous rate of carbon
storage, also increases. Simultaneously, eﬀective pollution by unit of carbon content (Pe
t /γRe
t)




Let us now give some elements on the-short term eﬀects of this climate policy on output’s
level and growth. First, as ge
Rt increases, early generations extract less resource; since labour
devoted to output is unchanged, output level diminishes for these generations. Second, since
ge
LQt increases, Le
Q, the eﬀort in carbon storage, decreases in the short-run7 (see Figure 5). Then,
as Le
Y is unchanged, Le
A and thus ge
A increase. Finally, output growth (ge
Y = νge
A + (1 − α)ge
R)
7Using (51) and (53), one can show that ∂L
e
Qt/∂t ≤ 0 if t is low enough.
19is fostered for early generations.
Now we analyse the eﬀects of the R&D policy. The impact of an increase in the subsidy to
R&D, ψ, on the price of an innovation is illustrated in 6.
Proposition 5 An increase in the subsidy to R&D, ψ, has the following eﬀects:
(i) The eﬀort in production (Le
Y ) diminishes.
(ii) Resource extraction and carbon emissions decrease at a lower pace, as well as the eﬀort





(iii) The intensity of eﬀort in CCS (Le
Q/Qe), the eﬀort by unit of carbon content (Le
Q/γRe),
the instantaneous rate of carbon storage (Qe/γRe), and eﬀective pollution by unit of carbon
content (Pe/γRe) remain unchanged.
The impact of such a policy on output is similar to what is obtained in standard endogenous
growth models. Since ge
Rt increases, Re decreases in the short-run. As Le
Y decreases (less eﬀorts
in output production), early levels of output Y e diminish. Moreover, since ge
LQt increases, Le
Q
decreases in the short-run. Thus we have a simultaneous decrease in Le
Y and Le
Q, which yields an
increase in Le
A (recall that total amount of labour is constant). For that reason, the accumulation
of knowledge is faster in the early generations: ge
A increases. As we also have an increase in ge
Rt,
output growth is unambiguously fostered in the short run.
5.2 Optimal policy
Comparing values in propositions 1 and 2, we obtain the following result which gives the design
of optimal policy instruments.
Proposition 6 ψo = 1 (optimal ﬁnancing of research) and τo =
ρω
δν(ρ+θ) are the levels of ψ and
τ for which the equilibrium path is optimal.
20First, note that this optimal tax level is expressed in terms of labour. Dividing this level by
price p (given in (19)), in which LY is at its equilibrium level (see (50)), and ψ = 1, we obtain:
τo/pt =
ω[1 + (ε − 1)/N]
ρ + θ
Yt. (20)
This corresponds to the optimal tax level in terms of consumption good. This tax grows at the
same rate as output, as depicted in Figure 7 (left panel).
As we commented earlier, the tax level here matters, contrary to standard results of the
literature (see Sinclair [18], Grimaud and Rouge [5, 6], Groth and Schou [7] for instance).
Indeed, when CCS technology is available, the social planner has to give the right signal in
terms of social costs of pollution to ﬁrms, so as to induce their optimal eﬀort in sequestration.
We now elaborate on this issue.
First, let us show that the optimal tax level (that we will refer to as the optimal price of
carbon) is equal to the sum of discounted marginal social costs for all (present and future)
generations, expressed in terms of good Y . For each generation, ω is the social cost of one
unit of carbon, given in terms of utility. Thus, at date t,
￿ +∞
t ωe−(ρ+θ)(s−t)ds = ω/(ρ + θ)
is the sum for all generations of this cost’s present values (taking regeneration into account).
Moreover, the marginal utility of any good j is 1/cj (see formula (8)). Taking into account the
mark-up on each consumption good’s market due to Cournot competition, and the fact that
we consider a symmetric equilibrium, we obtain the expression given in (20). Observe that,
when it is expressed in terms of utility, this optimal tax is constant over time. However, it is an
increasing function of time when given in terms of consumption good. Indeed, economic growth
being positive, the marginal utility of consumption decreases over time.
Second, this optimal tax leads to the optimal arbitrage between production and pollution,
given the availability of carbon storage technology. Let us assume a labour transfer from the
21carbon storage sector towards production, resulting in the emission of one additional unit of
pollution. The optimal tax corresponds to the subsequent marginal increase in good Y .
Proof. Taking mark-ups into account as we did above, one gets:
τo/pt = [(∂Yt/∂LY t)/(∂Qt/∂LQt)][1 + (ε − 1)/N].
This comes from the fact that ∂Yt/∂LY t = αYt/LY = 1/p[1 + (ε − 1)/N] (from (1) and
(19)) and ∂Qt/∂LQt = (1 − η)Qt/LQt = 1/τ (see formulas (4), (51) and (54)).
Finally, the optimal tax on pollution, which in particular leads to postponing resource ex-
traction, can be interpreted as a decreasing ad valorem tax on the resource (see Figure 7 (right
panel)). This allows to make a link with standard literature in the case of no carbon storage
(see Sinclair [18], Grimaud and Rouge [5, 6] or Groth and Schou [7]). When the optimal tax is
implemented, the "total" (i.e., including the price of the resource and the carbon tax) unit price
paid by users for the resource increases less fast than the unit price perceived by owners of the
resource (whose growth rate is the interest rate). That is why extraction is postponed. Ex-post,
this has the same eﬀect as a decreasing ad valorem tax.
Proof. "Total" price paid by ﬁrms is:
pRR + τoγ(R − γη−1RηL
1−η
Q ) = pRR
￿
1 + (τo/pR)(1 − (LQ/γR)1−η)
￿
.














that is, pRR(1 + σ) where σ can be interpreted as an ad valorem tax on the resource, which is
decreasing since pR is an increasing function of time (recall that gpR = r).
226 The eﬀect of technical progress in CCS: A numerical illustra-
tion
The model solutions have been obtained so far for a CCS technology without technical progress.
However, progressive improvements in this technology are likely to occur due to learning in the
early stages of its development (IPCC [11]). In order to grasp insights on how speciﬁc technical
progress to sequestration technology would alter our results, we introduce some exogenous trend
in the productivity of pollution mitigation activities. In this section, we restrict ourselves to the
analysis of the optimal paths that we illustrate owing to a sole numerical simulation. We thus
modify the carbon storage technology given by (4) using the following functional speciﬁcation
that corresponds to labour-augmenting technical progress:
Qnjt = (γRnjt)η(κt.LQnit)1−η, 0 < η < 1, if LQnit < γRnjt
with κt = κ0 − (κ0 − 1) ∗ e−κ.t
The numerical values for κ0 and κ are chosen to be 20 and 0.02, so that the function is strictly
increasing and concave. Technical progress is quickly enhancing the carbon storage productivity
in the early periods, due to the strong concavity of our speciﬁcation. Thus the amount of labour
dedicated to carbon removal, as well as the eﬀective amount of carbon sequestered (depicted
in Figure 8, Left panel), is increasing as compared to the no technical progress case developed
in section 3. The cumulative amount of carbon that is ultimately sequestered, corresponding
to the surface below the time-path of Qo
t, is increasing signiﬁcantly when dedicated technical
progress in introduced. As a result, the environmental quality Eo
t is degrading less rapidly and
is returning to its initial state in shorter time owing to natural regeneration (see Figure 8, Right
panel).
23It is beyond the scope of the current section to test the robustness of our results to the
speciﬁcation for technical progress. Still, the qualitative eﬀects of technical progress shall be
preserved with alternative speciﬁcations: Technical progress makes this climate change mitig-
ation option more eﬀective by reinforcing the capture of CO2 emissions throughout the entire
horizon. It alleviates the burden of pollution emission on environmental quality while hindering
economic growth to a lower extent.
7 Conclusion
We proposed a model of endogenous growth (à la Romer) in which output is produced from
knowledge, labour and a polluting non-renewable resource. The aim of the paper was to study
how previous results of the literature on growth and polluting non-renewable resources are
modiﬁed when carbon storage technology is available. Here, part of the carbon ﬂow that is
emitted when the resource is used within the production process can be stored. This implies
that, contrary to standard literature, pollution is dissociated from resource extraction. The
remaining ﬂow of carbon damages the state of the environment, which is harmful for household’s
utility.
We fully characterized the optimal trajectories. We showed how the CCS option speeds up
the optimal resource extraction and thus helps to partially relax the environmental constraint,
which reduces the sacriﬁce of early generations. Moreover, the path of GHG emissions is mod-
iﬁed. In the long-run, emissions unambiguously decrease, but we proved that pollution may
increase for the early generations if environmental preferences are low. Finally, we showed that
the availability of CCS technology is detrimental for growth.
Then we studied the impact of climate and R&D policies on the main relevant variables
in the decentralized economy. The climate policy consists in a tax on pollution (which is not
equivalent to a tax on resource, which would only yield second best outcome, contrary to models
24without carbon storage). First, we showed that the level of the tax matters, as it provides the
right incentives for an optimal eﬀort in storage activity. In addition, the optimal carbon tax is
proved to be equal to the sum of discounted marginal social costs for all (present and future)
generations (taking regeneration into account). Second, the optimal carbon tax is an increasing
function of time and leads to postponing extraction. Moreover, it can be interpreted (ex-post)
as a decreasing ad valorem tax on the resource: climate policy reduces the growth rate of the
"total" resource price (i.e., the resource price including carbon tax). Finally, we brieﬂy studied
the case of dedicated (exogenous) technical progress in carbon storage through a numerical
simulation.
The decarbonization of the economy and the switch to renewable or non fossil fuel-based
energy remains necessary (Gerlagh [2]). In order to keep the model tractable, the availability of
a clean and renewable energy source has not been introduced. This so-called backstop would not
drastically alter the qualitative properties of our results. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to
study the impact of the CCS option on the adoption timing of these alternative sources of energy.
We can infer that the possibility to store the carbon underground would delay the introduction
of renewable energy. Indeed, the availability and use of carbon sequestration technologies may
notably encourage a shift of electricity generation from natural gas to coal-based power plants
thus favoring a coal renaissance (Newell et al. [14]) over the next decades, while decreasing
reliance on renewable energy sources.
25Appendix
Appendix 1: Welfare
Let us consider the symmetric case in which Nj = N, Ynj = Y/N, Rnj = R/N, LY nj =
LY /N, LAnj = LA/N, LQnj = LQ/N and Qnj = Q/N. Then functions (1), (2), (3) and
(4) become Y = AνLα
Y R1−α, ˙ A = δLAA, P = γR − Q and Q = (γR)ηL
1−η
Q . Utility is now
U =
￿ +∞
0 (lnct + ωEt)e−ρtdt. The social planner maximizes U subject to the modiﬁed versions
of (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7). The current value Hamiltonian of the program is
H = ν lnA+αln(1−LA−LQ)+(1−α)lnR+ωE+µδLAA−ϕR+ζ
￿





where µ, ϕ and ζ are the co-state variables. The ﬁrst order conditions ∂H/∂LA = 0, ∂H/∂R = 0
and ∂H/∂LQ = 0 yield
−α/(1 − LA − LQ) + µδA = 0, (21)
(1 − α)/R − ϕ − ζγ(1 − ηγη−1Rη−1L
1−η
Q ) = 0, (22)
and − α/(1 − LA − LQ) + ζγη(1 − η)RηL
−η
Q = 0. (23)
Moreover, ∂H/∂A = ρµ − ˙ µ, ∂H/∂S = ρϕ − ˙ ϕ,and ∂H/∂E = ρζ − ˙ ζ yield
ρµ − ˙ µ = ν/A + µδLA, (24)
ρϕ − ˙ ϕ = 0, (25)
and ρζ − ˙ ζ = ω − ζθ. (26)
i) Computation of LY .
26Log-diﬀerentiating (21) with respect to time and using (24), one gets the following Ricatti dif-
ferential equation: ˙ LY = (δν/α)L2
Y −ρLY , whose solution is LY = αρ/
￿
δν + (αρ/LY 0 − δν)eρt￿
.
Using transversality condition lim
t−→+∞
µAe−ρt = 0, we show that LY immediately jumps to its
steady-state level:
LY = αρ/δν. (27)
Indeed, using (21) it turns out that the transversality condition is only satisﬁed when LY =
LY 0 = αρ/δν.
ii) Computation of ζ.
The solution for equation (26) is ζ = e(ρ+θ)t ￿
(ω/(ρ + θ)(e−(ρ+θ)t − 1) + ζ0
￿
. Moreover, the













Normalizing E0 such that the second term between brackets is not nil, we obtain
ζ = ζ0 = ω/(ρ + θ). (28)
iii) Computation of LQ.







iv) Computation of R.
Using (22), (28) and (29) we obtain R = 1−α












0 Rtdt = S0, after some calculations we obtain ϕ0 = B/(e
BρS0
1−α −1).
v) Computation of Q and P.
Plugging (29) into Q = (γR)ηL
1−η














vi) Computation of growth rates.
The growth rates directly follow from the log-diﬀerenciation of the preceding results.







































































Y t = νgo
At + (1 − α)go
Rt. (38)
Appendix 2: Welfare in the no-storage case
When no storage technology is available, maximizing welfare leads to the following results (recall
that we denote by Xo∅
t the optimal level of any variable Xt in this case):
28Lo∅
Y = αρ/δν, Lo∅
A = 1 − (αρ/δν), Ro∅
t = 1−α
ϕ∅









A + (1 − α)go∅
R , where ϕ∅
0 = B∅
e(B∅ ρS0/(1−α))−1 and B∅ = ωγ/(ρ + θ).
Appendix 3: Equilibrium
Here also, we consider the symmetric case, in which we also have pj = p and cj = c = Y for all
j. Then it can be easily veriﬁed that Ω = p1/(1−ε)Y and Γ = Y ε. This implies gΓ = εgY .
In this case, formulas (10)-(16) become:
r = ρ + gY + gp (Ramsey-Keynes), (39)
r = ˙ pR/pR (Hotelling rule), (40)
p[1 + (ε − 1)/N] = λ, (41)




λ = LY /αY, (43)
−1 + τ(1 − η)(LQ/γR)−η = 0, (44)
V δA = 1. (45)
Moreover, remember that the instantaneous market value of one unit of knowledge is
¯ v = V δLA + ψνLY /αA, where 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1, (46)
and that the standard arbitrage equation writes
r = ˙ V /V + ¯ v/V. (47)
29i) Computation of LY .
From (41) and (43), we have p(1 − (ε − 1)/N) = LY /αY . Hence we get gp = gLY − gY .
Plugging this into (39), we obtain r = ρ + gLY , which, together with (47) yield gV + ¯ vt/Vt =
ρ + gLY .
Since (45) implies gV = −gA = −δLA and ¯ vt/Vt = δLA + ψνδLY /α, we have the following
Ricatti diﬀerential equation −ρL2
Y + ψνδLY /α = ˙ LY . Using the transversality condition of the
household program, we can show that LY immediately jumps towards its steady-state level, as
we did in Appendix 1. Thus one gets
LY = αρ/ψνδ. (48)
Note that, since gLY is nil, r = ρ (remember that we normalized wage to 1).
ii) Computation of LQ.
Using (44), we immediately get
LQ = [(1 − η)τ]
1/η γR. (49)
iii) Computation of R.
First, note that formula (40) implies pR = pR0ert = pR0eρt. Then (43) and (42) together





, with G = τγ
￿
1 − η[(1 − η)τ]
(1−η)/η
￿
when τ ￿= 0.
Using
￿ +∞
0 Rtdt = S0 we obtain pR0 = G/(eψνδS0G/(1−α) − 1).
iv) Computation of Q and P.
Plugging (49) into Q = (γR)ηL
1−η
Q , one gets Q = [(1 − η)τ]
(1−η)/η γR.
30Then, using P = γR − Q , we have P =
￿
1 − ((1 − η)τ)(1−η)/η￿
γR.
v) Computation of growth rates.
The growth rates directly follow from the log-diﬀerenciation of the preceding results. In
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, and G = τγ
￿
1 − η[(1 − η)τ]
(1−η)/η
￿
when τ ￿= 0.
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Y t = νge
At + (1 − α)ge
Rt. (58)
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Figure 6: Sensitivity to parameter ψ of the innovation price expressed in terms of good (Left
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Figure 7: Optimal carbon tax in terms of consumption good τo/pt (Left panel) and equivalent
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Figure 8: Eﬀect of exogenous technical progress on the sequestred carbon Qt (Left panel) and
on the environmental quality Et (Right panel)
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